The alleged threats by an Indian embassy official against a TMDP-turned-Maoist MP have dominated the headlines this week. If true, it goes against the norms of diplomacy and the international system, not to mention civilised human behaviour.
It also provides an excellent opportunity to really think through the complex, multi-layered relationship between Indian officialdom and Nepali politicians. The case itself is a symptom of a much deeper malaise: flawed Indian policy, and a Nepali political culture with a shockingly high dependence on external patronage.
In mid-2009, India decided its security interests were at stake when the Maoists acted against the army chief. The Indians helped rally all the 'democratic forces' in an alternative alliance. Since then, the core objective of Indian policy has been to 'keep the Maoists out'. Everything else is secondary. They have been aided in this task by the Maoists themselves, who have failed to assess the balance of power correctly.
To achieve this, India has had to engage in an almost unprecedented degree of micro-management. This has involved keeping the 'democratic' parties together, punishing those who do not fall in line, managing disputes, providing regular advice to the government on how to deal with the Maoists, and in recent weeks, holding the Madhes alliance together.
In the process, India has alienated many actors, and generated enormous resentment. Pushpa Kamal Dahal is angry with Delhi for keeping him out; Jhalanath Khanal thinks he would have been PM but India stopped Upendra Yadav from backing him; Yadav himself is upset with Delhi for helping split his party; MPs in parties whose leaders are well rewarded by India feel nothing trickles down. And even those who do India's bidding privately complain about limited dividends. Add to this the royalists convinced that India disposed of the monarchy.
A lot of this may be perceptional rather than rooted in reality, but it shows that the present Indian policy has come at a high cost. Diplomats may be smug that they meet the policy bottom line, but if they want to avoid repeated embarrassment, a policy review in Delhi is well in order. They need to reconsider their medium to long-term goals, the tools at their disposal, the political costs being incurred, the tangible benefits, the degree of local politics they want to 'manage' or try to, and whether the leverage would be better used to get the peace process back on track.
But the other side of the story is the extreme hypocrisy of Nepali politicians themselves. Factions have long tried to use India against each other, going back to 1800 when the deposed raja Rana Bahadur lobbied the East India Company in Banaras against the Damodar Pande-influenced darbar. A little before that, in 1794, the regent Bahadur Shah responded to his sacking by Rana Bahadur by writing to Peking. Little has changed since then.
In the last five years, the Maoists and other political parties sought Indian political, moral, and financial support against the king. The Maoists courted the Indian embassy in their negotiations with Girija Prasad Koirala, and Koirala did the same, especially during the negotiations on arms and armies. The embassy helped Madhesi parties and the government reach a deal during the Madhes movement. The Maoists then tried to get India to exert pressure on Koirala to resign and pave the way for a government led by them after the elections.
A section in Kathmandu has idealised last year's 'democratic alliance', but it was the Indian establishment that enabled this alliance. To do that, they used coercion, inducement, and persuasion, just as now. Those who supported the alliance cannot wash their hands of the tactics that led to its formation when such revelations come to the surface.
Individual politicians across the spectrum are deeply enmeshed in this network. They solicit funds regularly, ask for 'advice', try to use Delhi or a wing of the embassy to undercut their own rivals within their parties, and in return promise to play along with the larger Indian game. This allows bureaucrats to take the politicians for granted and
treat them crudely when they step out of line.
At best, the present case may make Indian officials a bit more careful. But unless India feels the costs of its present approach are unacceptably high, or Nepali politicians develop a more sophisticated, and autonomous, way to deal with Delhi, the song will remain the same.
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