When he sent Gorkhali soldiers to war, Prithivi Narayan Shah told them: "Jai kataka nagara, jhiki kataka gara." (Don't kill unless attacked, but kill if attacked.) The Royal Nepal Army is now out of the barracks and fighting the Maoists under similar orders.

The surprise Maoist attack in late November forced the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) to take on the offensive. However, it is facing certain strategic difficulties in responding to the insurgents for several reasons: numerical inadequacy of troops deployed, our open border with India, and a cash-strapped national economy.

Then there are logistical problems fighting a guerrilla war in this terrain, Maoists can easily flee into India as the pressure against them intensifies, and although the military's intelligence gathering has improved it is still not adequate for infiltration.

The army is first concerned about its own security, thereafter it wants to secure the cities, and then the district headquarters. There is logic in the approach: because a cardinal rule of warfare is securing your own safety before attacking the enemy. There are several factors working in favour of the Royal Nepal Army in this war:
- All parliamentary parties support the deployment of troops against the rebels and so does the international community
- There are today many more access roads that reach deep into the hinterland
- The lack of accessible forests where the insurgents can hide for long periods

The Maoists now have less and less room to play, and the army can take the strategy of tiring them into surrender or defeat. Although it would benefit from a bigger fighting force, the RNA also has the advantage of numbers over the Maoists. However, the Maoists are battle-hardened and have a commitment to the revolution.

The Maoists need to spend about Rs10 million every month to keep the war going: for the upkeep of their own guerrilla force, logistics and hardware. The army would need at least five times that amount because it relies on air support, state-of-the-art weapons and other expensive equipment. Even though the cost may not be an immediate concern, over time it will be. Moreover, security spending will divert money from development which needs to go hand-in-hand to address the rural neglect that fuels the revolution.

The rebels want to fight the battle in the territory they know best, and are trying to lure the army to their lairs. Getting there is not only a logistical concern for the army, it also has to seal off the guerrillas' entry and exit routes. Even though it is a long shot, the army seems to be trying to tighten the stranglehold on the Maoist heartland without actually entering the areas themselves.

The Maoists are therefore fighting the war with ambushes, booby trap mines and their superior knowledge of the terrain. The army is not finding it easy to build a network of local informants because the Maoists are terrorising local people with brutal slayings of villagers.

This strategy is known as "red terror" in Maoist lore-a response to what is called the state's "white terror". This explains why the rebels have begun picking out innocent teachers, who they believe the army may try to use for its intelligence-gathering and infiltration. Teachers live in the villages, they have an intimate knowledge of the terrain and other villagers. They also happen to be employees of the state.

The army's psy-ops techniques now have to go beyond issuing sterile daily statements through the Defence Ministry. The Nepali people have been used to press freedom for the past 12 years, and they can tell when a news item sounds credible and when it doesn't. The other disadvantage is that the government is losing the battle for hearts and minds because development is at a standstill.

There has to be an immediate political understanding between the RNA and the civil government on delivering development to the grassroots. Having correct ground-level information needs a network of local informants: fire-power is useless unless you know where to shoot.

The Royal Nepal Army in the past two months has gained experience and is improving intelligence. Its strategy now will be to push the Maoists into higher terrain and keep them there. Dolakha, Udayapur and Dhankuta have now emerged important regions in this counter-insurgency thrust in the east. In the west, Gorkha, Palpa, Surkhet and Dang could be where this effort will be concentrated.

In line with Mao Zedong's doctrine, Nepal's Maoists have always planned and carried out a major assault on a police or army base every two months or so. The comrades call it "Dhakka": thrust. This is to keep their cadre in battle-readiness, maintain morale, and use the attacks for propaganda value to expose the government and military's vulnerability. They will pick soft targets that create the biggest news impact. Given the pressure the Maoists are under presently, and their affinity for anniversaries, such an attack on a major military base on or around 13 February is a possibility. Mobility is critical to the guerrillas, and they will try to break out of the army's cordon by ambushing convoys, hitting supply lines, and creating a rift between the local population and troops.

There is no doubt that the army's best chance of effectively defeating the Maoists in the short-term would be to get the leadership, as happened in Sri Lanka with an intelligence breakthrough that resulted in the arrest of the entire top brass of the JVP in 1989, as well as the capture of Abimael Guzman of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru in 1992. The rebels seem to have anticipated this, and have taken refuge in India.

A coordinated intelligence and undercover operation in collaboration with India is therefore needed not just for the leadership's whereabouts, but also to severe communication links between the top leaders and the cadre. Otherwise this crossborder element could complicate the insurgency, and join Nepali Maoists in a wider revolution with their comrades in Bihar, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh.

(Pushkar Gautam is a former Maoist area commander for Okhaldhunga and left the movement three years ago due to internal conflict with the leadership.)