When grievances pile up, and Nepalis see no recourse in a discredited government machinery, the legitimacy of rulers begins to crumble. This is what is feeding the Maoist insurgency, and that is where a response must begin.
n the final analysis it is the legitimacy of a government that is the single most important factor to determine the outcome of an insurgency. And nowhere is this more true than in the situation that we face in Nepal today five years after the start of the Maoist insurgency.
It was American military analyst Max G Manwaring who first developed the paradigm on which a response to an insurgency can be based in his 1991 book Uncomfortable Wars: Towards a New paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict. He analysed 43 post-World War II governments that resisted or succumbed to insurgencies. The ultimate outcome of any counterinsurgency effort, he said, is determined by six interrelated factors:
. Legitimacy of the government
. Organisation for unity of effort
. Type and consistency of support for the targeted government
. Ability to reduce outside aid to insurgents
. Intelligence (or action against subversion)
. Discipline and capabilities of the armed forces of the government
Legitimacy, or the moral right to govern, is gauged by the quality of national and local elections, viable political alternatives, high overall levels of participation, access by the left, and high commitment to democracy. The degree of legitimacy granted to a political system by the people of any society is related to the degree that they believe that the government "belongs to them", that it is responsive to them, and that they can influence its actions. Legitimacy of an incumbent regime is a primary strategic problem, and a serious effort to understand the issue and counter it should be the top priority in any anti-insurgency drive.
The struggle for legitimacy and allegiance by an existing regime and their legal as well as illegal opponents is more political and psychological than military. In Nepal's case corruption, political violence, lacklustre leadership and a growing insurgency has been steadily undermining whatever legitimacy was inherited from past elections and existed internationally or domestically-even within the army. In fact, there are not many people left in the insurgency-affected areas willing to provide their time, money and blood to the state.
The level of participation in both the national and local elections have been steadily declining since the onset of the Maoist insurgency, especially in the Maoist's "base areas". Political murders of village leaders has drastically reduced participation in local elections, and many who have been elected have given up their posts. Reports of irregularities during elections are also on the rise.
The cocktail of coalition governments that have taken office in the last five years may give an indication of the large number of viable political alternatives, but the shameless horse-trading that have led to these coalitions are undemocratic and even frightening. The minimal degree of dialogue and consensus required for democracy to function should have kept expanding in the last ten years, but in fact it has shrunk. The degree of civic and political liberty to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation has seen MPs being hijacked or locked up in hotels, or in hand-to-hand combat on the floor of the Lower House. Democracy does not just mean political freedom, it must also bring hope of improved economic well-being and social justice. Nepalis, it seems, aren't getting much of either.
A government must have the capacity to accomplish realistic expectations and demands of the citizenry. A reasonably effective and honest bureaucracy is a prerequisite, and one of the most pervasive factors in the loss of legitimacy of any regime is corruption. Unless persons and institutions within the nation are subordinate to the rule of law, the government cannot be considered morally legitimate. The law must be applied equally and impartially, and people with resources should not get the opportunity to influence the outcome of cases or to stay out of prison.
The ability of governments to extract resources in the form of taxes without resorting to coercion is a sign that the people support the government. How well the government is then able to use those resources to provide basic services and protection to the people becomes another key measure of legitimacy. If the ruling and opposition parties do not meet the standards of conduct expected by the people (especially in matters concerning corruption) political defeat is very likely.
And it is when these political, social and economic grievances pile up that the people see no recourse in a discredited government machinery. Then the legitimacy of rulers begins to crumble, and revolutionary slogans get populist support. This is the essential nature of what feeds an insurgency, and it is here that a response must begin. A campaign that fails to understand this and can only think of a military reaction is likely to fail. When the people become convinced that politicians are thieves, bureaucrats are kleptocrats and the army and police are being run by sycophants and petty thieves, an insurgency can only grow. When people with wealth not proportionate to either their income or ancestral property rule the nation, and when the majority of people under the poverty line are callously neglected, any option, however radical, becomes attractive for a people disenfranchised by the government they voted for.
In the past few years we have seen only a limited set of factors legitimising government institutions, and an overwhelming deterioration that undermines their legitimacy. Before the government starts doing something about the Maoist insurgency, it must admit and understand that it has a crisis of legitimacy on its hands. t
(Gyan Jung Thapa recently retired as a Colonel from the Royal Nepal Army. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from which he has a Masters in Military Arts and Science.)
