Excerpts from an article by Shanker Pokhrel
.The country is in a very difficult position because of the law and order situation. If such a situation persists for a long time, that will only mean more trouble and hardship. To change the status quo we must be prepared to bring about major improvements in the present conditions. The UML has realised this and has proposed a 22-point agenda for change which was approved by its Central Committee. The 22 points have to be pursued by government not only during peace time but even now, when it is fighting the Maoists.
However, the government seems bent only on following a policy of suppression. It has begun saying that it is impossible to sit and negotiate with the Maoists now. Government should keep the doors for negotiation open at all times if that is what can bring an end to the bloodshed. All forces in this country should work for long-lasting peace and prosperity. The government was forced to deploy the army to put an end to the bloodshed, mayhem and looting by the Maoists, but the government cannot completely forget the possibility of peaceful negotiation.

Why did the Maoists withdraw from negotiations all of a sudden? Did they have any idea of the political fallout of the sudden withdrawal? Why did they take such a suicidal decision? Many are asking these questions. It is said one of the main reasons the Maoists withdrew was the pressure of the cadres on the leaders. This line of reasoning is true to a degree-after all, after the dialogue process started, many Maoists had openly protested against their leaders' actions and also the peace process. Another explanation is that they wanted to undertake military action nation-wide to build pressure on the government to agree to their demands for a constituent assembly. But even if this were the object, there was no reason to attack the army. Could it be that the cadres attacked the army to break the negotiation process altogether, because the leaders had said they would not attack the army. Whatever the reason, this development will prove very detrimental to the Maoists in the long run. The position of those in favour of finding a peaceful solution to the problem have been weakened.

The Maoists may have expected that the army would be sent after them, but not that they would be declared terrorists, or than an emergency could be declared. They are probably shocked by the way the government is now moving against them. They never imagined that Sher Bahadur Deuba, who they used to refer to as "a flower blooming in the dirt," would take to such repression. Neither side anticipated the present situation, and Deuba will continue to get the support of everyone for some time at least. But it won't last forever. If this is not handled properly, there will be more problems for both the Maoists and Deuba. The Maoist leadership must admit its mistakes and return to the negotiating table with a more realistic agenda. The government must also not let the emergency last very long. Both sides must ensure that the emergency and the deployment of the army cause minimum damage. They need to realise that the only way out for the Maoists, the government and the country is a political solution, and should begin work in that direction.