These excerpts from Mao Zedong's Little Red Book-from sections on the armed struggle to capturing political power, surrounding the cities from "base areas" in the hinterland, and the formation of the People's Liberation Army-all show how closely Nepali Maoists follow Mao thought, and where they see fit to diverge. The excerpts also indicate which way the Maoists
are headed, and give us a glimpse of their ultimate destination.
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Historically, all reactionary forces on the verge of extinction invariably conduct a last desperate struggle against the revolutionary forces, and some revolutionaries are apt to be deluded for a time by this phenomenon of outward strength but inner weakness failing to grasp the essential fact that the enemy is nearing extinction while they themselves are approaching victory.
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If they [the Kuomintang] fight, we will wipe them out completely. This is the way things are: if they attack and we wipe them out, they will have that satisfaction; wipe out some, some satisfaction; wipe out more, more satisfaction; wipe out the whole lot, complete satisfaction. China's problems are complicated, and our brains must also be a little complicated. If they start fighting, we fight back, fight to win peace.
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If anyone attacks us and if the conditions are favourable for battle, we will certainly act in self-defence to wipe him out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely (we do not strike rashly, but when we do strike, we must win).
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As far as our own desire goes, we do not want to fight even for a single day. However, if circumstances force us to fight, we can fight to the finish.
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In the revolutionary war as a whole, the operations of the people's guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each other like a man's right arm and left arm. In concrete terms, especially concerning military operations, when we talk of the people in the base area as a factor, we mean we have an armed people. That is the main reason the enemy is afraid to approach our base area.
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The object of war is "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy" (which means to disarm him or "deprive him of the power to resist", and does not mean to destroy every member of his forces physically). Destruction of the enemy is the primary object of war and self-preservation the secondary, because only by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one effectively preserve oneself.
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Every war exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high one. Is this not in contradiction with "preserving oneself"? There is no contradiction at all; sacrifice and self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. All military operations-from the principles of shooting (taking cover to preserve oneself, and making full use of fire-power to destroy the enemy) to the principles of strategy-are permeated with this spirit. All technical principles and all principles concerning tactics, campaigns and strategy represent applications of this basic principle.
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Our principles of operation are:
(1) Attack dispersed isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated strong enemy forces later.
(2) Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.
(3) Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. This is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a city or place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.
(4) In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing the enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and an attack on one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even.
(5) Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions between the enemy and ourselves.
(6) Give full play to our style of fighting-courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, continuous fighting (fighting successive battles in a short time without rest).
(7) Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities.
(8) Concerning attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and weakly defended cities. As for strongly defended enemy fortified points and cities, wait until conditions are ripe and then take them.
(9) Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and materieal are at the front.
(10) Make good use of intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should not be very long, and the enemy should as far as possible be permitted no breathing space.
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"War is the continuation of politics." In this sense, war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character.... However, war has its own particular characteristics and in this sense, it cannot be equated with politics in general. "War is the continuation of politics by other . . . means." When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way. Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.
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History shows that wars are of two kinds, just and unjust. All progressive wars are just, and all wars that impede progress are unjust. Not only do we Communists not oppose just wars; we actively participate in them. World War I is an instance in which both sides fought for imperialist interests; therefore, the Communists of the whole world firmly opposed it. To oppose a war of this kind do everything possible to prevent it before it breaks out and, once it breaks out, to oppose war with war.
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Every Communist must grasp the truth; "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."
Seizing power by armed force, settling the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds universally.
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According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army. Some people ridicule us as advocates of the "omnipotence of war." Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad, it is Marxist.
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We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war.
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The Party commands the gun, the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.
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The People's Liberation Army has developed its vigorous revolutionary political work, an important factor in victory over the enemy, on the basis of a people's war and the principles of unity between army and people, between commanders and fighters, and disintegrating enemy troops.
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Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; people, not things are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. People necessarily wield military and economic power.
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The atom bomb is a paper tiger that US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but it isn't. Of course, it is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the people decide the outcome of a war, not one or two new types of weapon.
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Education in democracy must be carried on within the Party so that members can understand the meaning of democratic life, the relationship between democracy and centralism, and the way democratic centralism should be put into practice. Only in this way can we really extend democracy within the Party and at the same time avoid ultra-democracy and the laissez-faire that destroys discipline.
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In the sphere of theory, destroy the roots of ultra-democracy. Ultra-democracy damages or even completely wrecks the Party organisation and weakens or even completely undermines the Party's fighting capacity, thereby causing the defeat of the revolution. The source of ultra-democracy is in the petit bourgeoisie's individualistic aversion to discipline. These ideas are utterly incompatible with the proletariat's fighting tasks.
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Our slogan in training troops is "Officers teach soldiers, soldiers teach officers and soldiers teach each other." The fighters have a lot of practical combat experience. The officers should learn from them, when they have made other people's experience their own, they will become more capable.
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As for the training courses, the main objective should still be to raise the level of technique in marksmanship, bayoneting, grenade-throwing and the like. The secondary objective should be to raise the level of tactics, with special emphasis on night operations.
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Wherever there is struggle there is sacrifice, and death is a common occurrence. But we have the interests of the people and the sufferings of the great majority at heart, and when we die for the people it is a worthy death. Nevertheless, we should do our best to avoid unnecessary sacrifices.
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All men must die, but death varies in its significance. Dying for the people is weightier than Mount Tai, but working for fascists and dying for exploiters and oppressors is lighter than a feather.
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What Is Guerrilla Warfare?
In a revolutionary war, guerrilla operations are necessary and must not be considered an independent form of warfare. Guerrilla warfare is a weapon a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used by those who oppose him to advantage.
During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army.
We pursue our basic policy, the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front, to gain our political goal, the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realisation of this policy:
1. Arousing and organising the people
2. Achieving internal unification politically
3. Establishing bases
4. Equipping forces
5. Recovering national strength
6. Destroying enemy's national strength
7. Regaining lost territories
Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather and the situation of the people.
In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated.
Some simple-minded militarists say: "We are not interested in politics only in the profession of arms." It is vital that they be made to realise the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs.
With guerrillas, a discipline of compulsion is ineffective. It must be self-imposed, so the soldier is able to understand completely why he fights and why he must obey. In a revolutionary army, all individuals enjoy political liberty and the question of the emancipation of the people must not only be tolerated but discussed, and propaganda must encouraged. It is incorrect to hold to a theory of equality in all things. But there must be equality of existence in accepting the hardships and dangers of war. There is also a unity of spirit that should exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eighth Route Army put into practice a code known as "Three Rules and the Eight Remarks":
Rules:
All actions are subject to command.
Do not steal from the people.
Be neither selfish nor unjust.
Remarks:
Replace the door when you leave the house.
Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
Be courteous.
Be honest in your transactions.
Return what you borrow.
Replace what you break.
Do not bathe in the presence of women.
Do not without authority search those you arrest.
