During the six-month ceasefire period in 2003, Nepal's donors spent much money taking our politicians, human rights activists and journalists to Sri Lanka to observe the Norwegian-brokered peace process between the Tamil Tiger separatists and the Sri Lankan government.

That fragile ceasefire is still holding and there are some lessons there for Nepal-that a break in the hostilities even without actual peace building is still better for the people than war. But our peaceniks would have learnt much more if they had studied Sri Lanka's JVP uprising in the south instead.

In 1988-90, this extreme Marxist neo-nationalistic insurrection claimed tens of thousands of lives. Sri Lanka then had two full-scale civil wars going on at the same time: the separatist conflict in the northeast and the insurgency in the south. Both were much more virulent than what we see in Nepal today. From 1984 to 2002, nearly 100,000 people lost their lives.

The JVP uprising was finally quelled in 1991 when an intelligence breakthrough led to the capture and execution of five of its top leaders. The rebel group that once believed in the inevitability of an armed struggle then joined mainstream politics. With its populist and flag-waving nationalism, the JVP won four parliamentary seats in the 1993 elections and now has 31 of 225 seats in the current parliament. It even had four ministerial portfolios in President Chandrika Kumaratunga's UPA government which collapsed last week when the JVP withdrew its support. It opposed the president's proposal to share over $3 billion in tsunami relief with the Tamil Tigers.

By giving up violence, the JVP was able to wield much more power than it would ever have attained through force. Kumaratunga also made the emotionally difficult choice of forging a political partnership with the people who assassinated her charismatic husband, Vijaya, in 1988. Still, the government and rebels showed statesmanship in responding to the wishes of a war-weary people.

There are many lessons we in Nepal can learn from the history of the JVP in Sri Lanka:

. A counterinsurgency war can't be won by adding guns, artillery, helicopter gunships and by doubling troop strength, what is critical is the quality of intelligence
. The government must demonstrate that it is a credible alternative to the rebels by protecting its citizens and delivering basic services
. True and lasting political power comes from the ballot, not the bullet
. Violence only begets more violence and pushes the country toward the self-destructive path of militarisation, further delaying social and political reform

By now, it must be self-evident to our own rulers that weapons acquisition is not only unaffordable, it is also not going to win this war. Maoist leaders, on the other hand, just need to look at their Sri Lankan comrades to see how easy it is to become political kingmakers by giving up violence.