By hurriedly calling off the truce and the peace talks, the Maoists made a mistake once again. Nationwide public opinion in favour of a constituent assembly was being garnered, even among those who were adamantly against it: industrialists, intellectuals and certain sections of civil society. It was becoming an issue of public debate. If asked to choose between civil war and a constituent assembly, almost every peace-loving Nepali would opt for the latter. The five party alliance was preparing for a decisive agitation against regression. This was an agitation against an assertive monarchy and it would have been in the Maoists interest for the agitation to be successful. Had the government used violence to put down the agitation, it would have pushed the parties nearer the rebels. The Maoists showed that they did not understand the shift in public opinion when things were going their way. They were looking at a one-dimensional military strategy, proving that they are dominated by a militaristic mindset that ignores overwhelming public opinion and alliances that would benefit them. The result is what we have now?a war that is more brutal and costly than before, opening the door to possible interference from the outside.
Just like the peace talks two years ago, things this time around stalled over the same issue: a constituent assembly, all because the government is reluctant to revert real sovereignty to the Nepali people. Their concept paper underlines a commitment to this end, yet it was against this powerful expression of sovereignty. The government was ready to debate only a constituent assembly without any intention of honouring it. In the end, the concept paper failed to address the main demands of both the Maoists and the parties. Their demand that the Maoists disarm before any agreement was reached was also unacceptable to the rebels. Lastly, the fact that the concept paper was immediately welcomed by the US, UK and India gave the impression that it was instigated by foreign powers.