Premature expectations of peace had wrecked the third round of peace talks even before it started because both the parties had ignored the basics of negotiation: accommodation and compromise.

The protagonists had boxed themselves in, and saw negotiation simply as part of a bargaining process. Bargaining occurs within the context of values, interests and power relations. Since each party's power is limited by the power of the other, persuasion is the key currency. Hard bargaining and inflexibility work only in an asymmetric situation. When both sides are relatively even, rigidity impedes negotiations. And that is why the talks got nowhere.

Holding on to one's position without considering the other's is not negotiation, but imposition. If negotiation cannot be a process of problem solving, it can be made a part of policy-making. Without touching raw nerves on either side, both negotiating parties can jointly decide to depart from the existing framework. Towards this end, it is necessary to first agree that rigid positions are indeed irreconcilable and beyond redemption.

The second approach to policymaking is to set the goal first by exploring all options. If these are inadequate, evolve plausibly alternative options. Many uncertainties associated with the Third Round reflected a widening gap in approaches. Things were bound to flounder, and they did.

The constitutional monarchy, under the 1990 Constitution, functions only in case of the presence of the elected parliament and the government. This void has to be addressed first if the mandatory basis for negotiation is to be addressed. The question of constituent assembly can then be repackaged as a decision ultimately to be taken by a legitimately elected government in power.

Only an elected government made up of political parties can decide and ensure the conduct of constituent assembly elections with a popular mandate. The constitution of Nepal can be drafted, endorsed and implemented only by popular will. Neither the Maoists nor a king with executive powers can concede to the point unless the political parties representing the people comply with the decision.

If the Maoists, as they claim, are a political force, they should not fear an electoral test. Their claims of political legitimacy and commitment to peoples' sovereignty would be indisputably justified. Otherwise they would just be a gun-totting group in the margins, whose adherence to violence would justify repression.

The monarchy, on the other hand, would certainly fail to emerge as a stabilising force in the pernicious environment of domestic politics-unable to rein in political dissent of a non-violent movement demanding political space arrayed against the spiralling violence of the Maoist insurgency.

The king needs a face-saving way to shed the executive powers he wrested. King Gyanendra said last week he wishes to be a "constructive monarch", perhaps the occasion has arrived for a constructive contribution to untangle this stalemate. Both the insurgent Maoist and a resurgent monarchy can then meet the popular aspirations of the people by bringing back the democratic process to the centre stage of Nepali politics.

There was a conspicuous absence of another integral factor in the talks scuttled by Prachanda on Wednesday: trust. Negotiators first need to allay deep-seated suspicions of each other to build confidence. In our case, neither party has taken up previous commitments and therfore mistrust can only grow.

Emotion and insecurity had enveloped the negotiation process. The previous government teams were ad hoc, self-serving and insecure bogeymen compared with the disciplined and committed Maoist team. A member of the government negotiation team even disclosed his differences on the agreed agenda, publicly exposing rifts.
The Maoists for their part had cried wolf so many times by threatening to go back to war if the government didn't agree to their demands, that it is not credible any more. They had to do something to win back their credibility.

The government's concept paper tabled at the Third Round involved a m?nage a trois: the king, the army and the parties. Though the document says that the ultimate decision makers of the state are the people, it asserts "the role and importance of Nepali monarchy is irreplaceable for the continuity and preservation of the sanctity of the national independence and territorial integrity of the country.. Therefore, the institution of monarchy shall continue to remain as a symbol of Nepali nationality and national unity."

This contravened the idea of people's sovereignty. The government failed to provide a meeting point for dialogue when it asked the Maoists to surrender their arms and ammunition without considering any likely options and response of the other side. To make the case more palatable, the government should have advanced the proposal for demobilisation as a part of a peace process. Conditional upon the agreement for demobilisation both parties could have explored each other's position to realise the goal. There could also have been a commitment to evolve detailed parameters through negotiation.

Third, the government's negotiating agenda was vague and was thoroughly manipulative. The objectives set by the government could not be achieved through joint decision, but by honest governance. Such stinginess showed that the parties to negotiations don't really care about the peace process. Most damaging is their rigid posturing without leaving fallback options.

But by far the greatest void in the negotiation process was the absence of political parties, and through them the popular will. Although the fallout of the negotiation process and its implications will be shared by all Nepalis, they had no real say in this ill-fated peace process. Political parties, despite their failings, have a decisive role in salvaging the country.

King Gyanendra said in his interview last week (#159) that an active monarchy was incongruous in the 21st century. He should translate this thought into action by winning the confidence of the political parties whose bottom line for the future of Nepal, after all is, is also a constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy.
The king can still constructively mobilise this force in sustaining his objective of independent and democratic Nepal wherein monarchy in reality emerges as a concrete manifestation of national unity not just a symbol.

Dhruba Kumar is a political scientist at the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS)