So, finally we have peace. We all wanted peace, even the Maoists. Whatever their stated declared aspirations, the palace, security forces, Maoists, political parties and all Nepalis want peace. But before we go headlong into this process, we should stop just a moment to reflect upon what kind of peace we want? Is it to be peace at any cost? Are we to hazard the future for a respite in the present? Indeed, which side is more desperate for a respite? Do our negotiators really know what they are risking? Doubtless, the country has suffered and a solution is required. You cite the "lessons" we can learn from Sri Lanka ("Lessons from Lanka", #135), but the government there is bending over backwards to accommodate the Tamils.
Has our army fought for 20 years and brought to its knees? Did it look like we will never win? Are we a failed state with a dysfunctional military where the balance of power reflects the reality of having to draw a line of control or a zone of separation? Are we really so desperate as a nation that we have to allow a minister of dubious moral and alleged family ties to the Maoist military leader to deal on our behalf? It is now an open secret that the announcement of the ceasefire was a surprise, not just to the political parties and the army but the cabinet itself. This implies that the deal is actually done and the talks are just a formality, which the minister himself has tacitly implied. Does the palace have the legitimacy, credibility or right to gamble on our future? Do the sacrifices till this day have no meaning? Shouldn't the political parties with popular representation or the army which shed blood to make this day possible have a say?
Having reached its peak during the surprise attack on Dang, which finally dragged the army into equation, the Maoists, despite few measured successes, were slowly but surely being pushed back militarily. Not employing the army when the police was being butchered was an unforgivable neglect. After their Jumla and Rumjatar misadventures the Maoists lost a lot of their men, they were running low on ammunition, food, medicines, recruits, morale and (most importantly) on popularity. News of army mass recruitment, induction of helicopters, US military advisory personnel and weapons on regular basis cannot have made their perception of the future any rosier. Moreover the increasing dominance by the security forces on the battlefield meant a proportional decrease of their playground and freedom of action. In simple terms, the Maoists are and ought to be far more desperate for ceasefire.
They need a safe landing now, while they still retain a chance to get some votes. They know deep inside that if they miss the boat this time, they will have to come in for talks on their knees the next time around. On that note, the army seems to have achieved the aim of "creating an environment for talks". So, how wise was it to surrender the advantage gained through 15 months of blood, sweat and toil? The code of conduct, even the small bits of it that have been leaked, contains aspects more characteristic to a ceasefire induced by insurmountable stalemate-like Sri Lanka. And it is atrocious to even think of integrating the Maoists into the army.
What we need to contemplate is that when the entire mechanism of governance almost collapsed, when even the palace had its own demeaning crisis, we all had in the army (for all its faults) one institution that lived together, a pillar for the nation to lean on. Instead of thanking it, we are hell-bent on compromising it in the name of peace. Peace at what cost? Hopefully, we are not na?ve enough to believe that the Maoists have changed their spots. The palace, political parties, the army and more importantly we the people should not compromise on integrating the Maoists into the army. This is supposed to be a ceasefire, not a surrender.
"Anil",
Ohio University
