KUNDA DIXIT |
David Seddon, co-author of Nepal in Crisis: Growth and Stagnation at the Periphery (1980), The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives and The Struggle for Basic Needs in Nepal, Peasants and Workers in Nepal, spoke to Nepali Times in Kathmandu this week about why his dire predictions about Nepal haven't come true. He warns about the dangers of defining social exclusion only in terms of caste and ethnicity.
Nepali Times: You made some pretty dire predictions about this country 30 years ago. Yet, Nepal hasn't collapsed or become a failed state. How do you explain that?
Of course you are right almost every country is always in a series of changes and crises. But what we felt in the mid-1970s, was that there was a certain political statis under the Panchayat system, but we didn't talk much about that. Our focus was very much on the economic and social lives of the people in rural areas of the west-central region. At that time we felt that the dynamic in agriculture in particular was incredibly limited. There was a growing problem of food and food security, and all the commentators in the 70s were very gloomy about the economic prospects and particularly the problem of food security and we shared that concern.
That has been proven to be unduly pessimistic. Nepal has over the years in a variety of ways managed to maintain enough food supply to meet its requirements, despite the WFP talking about food deficit regions and so on. On the whole Nepal has managed to remain largely food self-sufficient. And where people have run short, they have been able to by and large purchase it as markets have developed. We were unduly pessimistic on the agriculture front. Right up to the late 90s commentators were looking at Nepal as an agrarian economy, that was the focus, so we like everyone else focused on dynamics of agriculture. In the 1990s there was another thrust with the Agriculture Perspective Plan that argued that the motor for growth was agriculture.
What hasn't happened is the kind of green revolution transformation of agriculture, cash-crop and commodity production. That was in the 70s and now 40 years on, that is still the case the development of a cash crop economy is less dramatic than one would have hoped. There are areas where it is happening, for example the eastern Tarai is very dramatic. So, I think we rather generalised the economic crisis, on the basis of the agriculture which at that time 80-90 per cent of the people were involved in and it was 60 per cent of the GDP, so it looked important. We also did not adequately pick up the growth in inter-cropping, and introduction of winter wheat, for example. We returned to the same areas in the mid-1990s, and did a re-study on a smaller scale of the same area and two things mainly struck us: there was still very little progress on cash crop and commodity production, in fact if anything there had been a retreat, and the other part was that people seemed to be relying increasingly on remittances from abroad.
Your other dire prediction then was that Nepal was on the brink of environmental collapse. But even there, despite problems, there has been progress in the last 40 years.
That is right, we have been proven again to have been unduly pessimistic about environmental change. We weren't talking about climate change then, it was the physical destruction of resources. In hindsight, most areas of the western and eastern hills deforestation and land degradation did continue on till the 1980s and was a serious problem, and remains a serious problem. People still rely on fuel wood, timber is still logged, forests continue to decline particularly in the Tarai. But in the eastern hills which we studied, there has been a certain amount of natural regeneration in the highest areas, in the middle hills there has been significant reforestation partly because of community forestry management, and farmers are now increasingly involved in maintaining the environment and that integration of cropping and forestry has become more dense. So we were over-pessimistic on environmental degradation on the forestry side. The other reason there has been a regeneration of scrub and forest land is that in the last ten years increasingly men have been travelling away from rural areas out of agriculture into the towns or to work abroad, and there has been a reduction in the area under cultivation. You could see this positively in environmental terms. There is an increase in natural regeneration, but there has been a reduction in the rural capacity of food production. Agriculture proved to be more dynamic than we had thought both in terms of food production capacity, intercropping, new crops, cash crops. But the development of commercial farming is still limited, for better or for worse.
Your first book was on the impact of roads. Do you still hold the view that roads are largely disruptive?
Yes and no. I think that in the short-run building roads is not cost-effective, but it can be argued that over a long term, 40 years or so, roads provide arguably a necessary but not sufficient condition for development. They can provide a foundation from which other road networks and other forms of change can develop, and their full positive impact can't be felt for 40 years or so. Roads undoubtedly encourage flows of people and goods, that can work both ways. They are not always a benefit they can also be a dis-benefit. I think one should add in modern terms to roads the idea of communications, because roads allow movement of people and transport of goods, but increasingly in Nepal it is the movement of ideas and information, as in the rest of the world, that is really important. The IT revolution has meant that in a way it is not roads that is so important now as it is the spread of ideas and information and how people use that I think will be profoundly important in the future. That is a positive for Nepal because the statistics suggest that there is now very widespread use of social media and mobile phones and people will gather information and ideas and be able to communicate with their families, we haven't seen the implication of this yet in Nepal or anywhere, profoundly revolutionary.
Forty years ago, you also saw overpopulation and the lack of employment as a fuel for future unrest. There were two democracy movements and a war, so that prediction was borne out.
We were accused of being 'radical pessimists' at the time as all the dependency theorists were. The impact of malaria eradication in the 1960s, which opened the up the Tarai, is the great development intervention in Nepal with long-standing implications. Ten years later, we were already beginning to get some sense of the migration from the hills to the Tarai but I don't think we picked up the importance of that as much as we should have done. In retrospect, in 70s and 80s there was a massive relocation of population from the hills to the Tarai and that absorbed that population growth to a very significant degree. It was a safety valve for the next 20 years, and it contributed to the large output of agriculture in the Tarai and it became the breadbasket. We underestimated that kind of transformation. If you look at the hill areas in the last 10 years, especially in the eastern hills which we studied, there has been a net decline in population. Natural population growth is relatively low, and there is migration out. And other thing that we didn't pick up until the 90s with our re-study was labour migration which at that time was mainly to India. The politics at the time suggested to us that there was a limit to migration to India, what nobody really saw coming until the late 1990s when we did study the "New Lahureys" was the great increase in migration to Japan, Korea, Malaysia and to the Gulf.
So, like the Tarai was the safety valve for agriculture, foreign migration turned out to be the safety valve for employment generation?
Migration did not really become a safety valve for employment till the mid-1990s. The lack of employment and frustration in the lead-up to the People's War were very real. The Maoists benefited from this frustration not just with poverty but growing inequality, in a sense recruitment into the PLA was not just because people were ideologically motivated but also substantially because they were looking for some alternative to unemployment. So we did recoup our study by this revisit in the 1990s, when we found two main things were happening: the lack of development of cash cropping in the western hills and the growth in remittances from abroad. With colleagues (Jagannath) Adhikari and (Ganesh) Gurung we ended up writing quite a bit about foreign remittances. Now it is well accepted that it is a crucial part of the Nepali economy, but it is a double-edged sword.
Given the contradictions in Nepali society and economy in the 70s did you feel that something like a Maoist revolution was inevitable?
It was a very economics-grounded analysis, but we did say at the end of the book that we didn't see a way out other than some sort of dramatic political transformation. I personally came back in the 80s and worked on Nepal: A State of Poverty in which I was much more explicit where I did see the beginnings of organised movements for a political alternative. A decade later, in the 80s I was talking about the frustrations that were beginning to build up. If you look at the post-1990 period economic and social demographic statistics were on the whole fairly positive, it was quite a dynamic period, and there was a tendency to over-criticise the politicians saying that we were getting nowhere. And the Maoist of course launched their war based on the perception of a deepening frustration that what had been promised in the early 1990s hadn't materialised. Ten years later we were in the middle of an intensifying, deepening war, the royal massacre and 9/11 had led to a hardening of positions, Maoists were successful in gaining territory and support, Gyanendra staged a royal coup and there was the beginnings of a backlash as the international community turned against him.
So, the two Jana Andolans were opportunities to move forward. But since 2008 there has been a period of political stalemate. In the meanwhile ordinary people carry on the best they can, labour migration continues to bring in remittances, there are some signal failures: hydropower is an area where there has been a complete failure to capitalise on Nepal's major potential. Lenin once said 'development is Soviets plus electricity', we don't have Soviets, but we don't have electricity either. This is a huge failing in industrial growth, health, education, all of these suffer because of the lack of electricity.
So we are still in crisis?
It is the political and legislative crisis that people are focused on, but underneath there is a continuing economic crisis about the failure to create an economy that generates employment productive growth. Nepal has become like Yemen or Jordan that rely on labour migrants to keep the economy going.
One of the reasons for the constitutional and political stalemate post-2008 has been the demand for identity-based federalism. You have been slightly critical of that idea.
I have been very critical. The Irish response to a question like 'where do you go now' is 'I wouldn't have started from here'. For me the strength of the Maoist movement was that it was a class-based, it's about people who are disadvantaged economically and socially. Let's refer to it as a horizontal cleavage between the relationship between the rich and poor. My sense is that sometime during the middle of the war, the Maoists for tactical reasons began to see ethnic identity as a basis of support and out of that came what I think is a dangerous and misleading philosophy: that you can address ethnic and caste inequalities which undoubtedly exist and need to be addressed in society by recognising them as ethnic groups which have some sort of vote in so far as they are from an ethnic group or caste. For me that fundamentally violates universal human and democratic rights. As an individual I should have the right to vote for whatever party I want, not vote only on the basis of my ethnic or caste identity. Everything is caste, you will forgive the pun, in one identity. I find that profoundly undemocratic and racist. There are countries that have organised themselves on the basis of religious groups and so on, like Lebanon, and it's a recipe for disintegration and chaos. It is really not the basis for an effective state. It also has the dangers of ethnic cleansing in which you begin to define people only by their caste and ethnicity. So whether I am a very wealthy Gurung or a poor Gurung, whether I am a wealthy Bahun or a poor Bahun and seems not to be a caste-based position. So I am surprised that the Maoist have maintained what I thought was only a tactical approach drawing on the support of the Magar in Rukum and Rolpa and other ethnic groups, and has now become a flawed ideology.
The danger of this is the endless proliferation of groups. Take the Madhesis, there is a legitimate grievance of the people of the Tarai because of political marginalisation, failure to recognize their numbers and so on. Madhesi is a lumpy category and immediately other groups like the Tharus disassociated themselves. There are more than 100 ethnic and caste groups in Nepal, each one then has the right to special identity representation, it splits and splits and splits again. Secondly, if you are going to organise a federal state on that basis, most federal states are based on already existing social-economic-cultural entities, take the example of the Limbuwan the majority of the people in that area are not Limbu. There is no so-called ethnic autonomous region proposed in which the ethnic category is the majority even. So not only do you have a problem of majority overwhelming the minority, but you have the problem of states which are defined by the ethnic identity of a minority. It doesn't make a lot of sense if you see the mosaic of different groups in Nepal there is no logic of division in terms of territory, it seems to me a misleading dangerous idea.
Federalism will add another layer of government, bureaucracy and so on, it is expensive and this is not something Nepal can afford whatever the shape it takes. If it doesn't actually divide Nepal into economically strategic and sensible regions or provinces, there is the danger of comparative disadvantage being used. If you happen to be in the Karnali and there is no central government to redistribute resources, you are always going to remain marginal and weak. Federalism is a dangerous division even on a territorial and development basis.
But when identity-based federalism becomes a political ideology as it has now, it isn't easy anymore to backtrack.
We should never have got to this point, but we recognise I guess that for some reason federalism appeared first in the first interim constitution and as you say has grown to become a political ideology of substance, although very dangerous. I see it as a way to identify one grouping as against another which is the NC, UML and its constellation that are now defined as non-federalists. If federalism is now on the agenda, and all things I have been saying are sort of out of date, then I think the best one could hope for is some form of federalism which is based on geographic, and economic factors, where there is an acceptance of regional differences in different parts of Nepal and where proper democratic representation according to population is taken into account. What is needed is a re-examination of the electoral constituencies so they do represent the populations in them, to me that would satisfy to some extent the concerns of the Madhesis that the actual population in the south is represented properly but on the basis of universal rights rather than ethnic or caste identity.
Still, how do you address the serious imbalance caused by the historical caste domination of the bureaucracy and government?
I think that is something that every party needs to address, including and one might even say particularly the UCPN and CPN. But, yes, there is no doubt that there is a dominance. But this is not just a caste and ethnic dominance, this is about those who are wealthy and powerful, and again as an old Marxist I would emphasise the class nature of this dominance. It's not just that people are Brahmins and Chhetris or Newar, these are educated with wealth and power and what needs to happen is that there should be an opening up of opportunities in government in political parties in regions for people who are from disadvantaged ethnic groups and castes, but more generally people who are disadvantaged. So I see it as a power and wealth control rather than on that should be framed always in terms of caste and ethnicity. I think there is a dangerous racism. It is really about power and control. Bahun chhetri leaders will be rich and powerful so will Janajati leaders, so will the leaders even of Dalit groups. I have noticed that the most of the leaders of Dalit groups are Biswakarma, and there are very few Sarki, Damai, Pode. Always in my view there is a class basis under which it is the rich and powerful who control the country.
How much do you blame Nepal's international partners for this?
That's not their responsibility in the sense that what happens in Nepal is mainly for Nepalis to determine. But there is no doubt that the international community has played its part all along, since the 1950s, in shaping the way development and political discourse has taken place. And not surprisingly, given the countries that are involved, they haven't challenged the fundamental status quo. They have tried to improve things where possible, partly through technical assistance and providing infrastructure. There has been no challenge of the status quo, and perhaps rightly so. On ethnic-based federalism, led possibly by people in the World Bank and supported by DFID, there is this concern about the exclusion of marginal peoples, and the agenda of inclusiveness. Unfortunately, for all sorts of reasons, the focus whether it was because anthropologists were involved rather than radical economists, the frame of reference is very much in terms of caste and ethnicity rather than in terms of class. And although poverty became important, people did not talk about workers and peasants and certain disadvantaged classes, they talked about talked about social exclusion in terms of caste and ethnicity which then became the conventional wisdom and the dogma. Donor agencies particularly the World Bank and DFID felt projects should be defined in those terms every effort should be made to include people gender caste and ethnicity. What they didn't focus on was groups and class differences and so on. In that sense they have contributed to a dominance of a discourse that focuses on caste and ethnicity and that has something to do with the growing dominance of social development in development agencies in the 50s right through to the 70s it was predominantly economists who spoke about development, GDP, agriculture and roads. The 70s and 80s was all about market forces. During the 90s, partly because of the conflict it became more about poverty and inclusion and that reflects international concerns as well. The first HDR in 1990 had a focus on poverty, so since then there has been this effort to define development as not just economic growth and markets but also in terms of social development, NGOs, civil society. But the social issues were mainly addressed from the perspective of caste and ethnicity in Nepal rather than class. Social development concerns of the 1990s gave way to conflict, the development agencies all because very interested in conflict, conflict management and since then have focused on the post-conflict and since then have moved more into the political domain. Now, whether that is legitimate for development agencies I think is very debatable. More money has been spent on training and constitution-building workshops than on agriculture and road-building in the last five years. So the development agencies have moved from economic and infrastructure into social development into political interference, you can debate whether that is legitimate or not. But I think not.
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Textbook history, ANURAG ACHARYA
To blame outsiders for Nepal's ills is to excuse the mistakes of our rulers and misread history