Normatively, the withdrawal of Ram Chandra Poudel's candidature offers one final opportunity to break the political impasse and re-engineer the consensus needed to finish the peace and constitutional process. This would mean politicians limiting their personal ambitions, broadly agreeing on the rules of the game, stepping down from their maximalist positions, and addressing each other's mutual insecurities and vulnerabilities.
So Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Jhalanath Khanal should be doing all they can to get the Nepali Congress on board in any power-sharing arrangement; NC, Madhav Nepal and KP Oli should undergo a change in heart and make way for the Maoists; all forces should arrive at a common conception of Nepal's future political system; and India should become a benign and supportive force.
But normative thinking is meaningless while analysing political processes. Empirically, there is no reason to believe this will happen � for the fundamental personal and ideological factors that led to the impasse in the first place have not changed but only deepened in the past seven months.
Dahal may first make a half-hearted bid at power, but since he has already realised that his prospects are weak, there is a good chance he will live up to his word and back Khanal as PM. The calculation is that this will constitute a snub to India, enable the Maoists to re-enter the power structure, and sharpen the divisions within UML � eventually benefiting the Maoists. It will also leave the Maoists in a relatively more advantageous position to deal with what happens on 28 May and its aftermath.
Even though this is Khanal's best chance, five forces � for different reasons � will seek to block him. Within UML, Nepal and Oli will deploy the argument they used in July to impose a two-thirds majority criteria on Khanal, and ask, "Why should we replace one majority government with another and break the democratic alliance in the process?" NC withdrew on the request of its allies in UML to strengthen precisely this position, and will do its bit to galvanise opinion against Khanal.
Within the Maoists, Baburam Bhattarai will argue that it is futile to back a candidate from another party in a majority government set-up. His question will be, "Can a government that excludes NC, and sections of the Madhesi parties, create a conducive atmosphere for constitution-writing? Is integration really possible in such a set-up?" Mohan Baidya and company are already questioning the logic of backing a UML candidate for government leadership when the roadmap is revolt. And India, which sees Khanal as a Maoist rubber stamp, will like the last time encourage its friends across party lines to undermine his prospects.
So, forming a UML-Maoist alliance will be an enormous challenge. If Khanal and Dahal succeed, the country may get a new government.
But it will isolate NC, which will not cooperate on constitution writing; alienate some Madhesi outfits, which will raise the rhetoric in the Tarai; strengthen the NA stance on integration; and anger India, which will destabilise the government almost immediately.
A repeat of the UML-NC 'democratic alliance', unlikely as it is, would be an exercise in futility too. The past year and a half has already shown how isolating the Maoists is not a solution. Dahal is also encouraging Sher Bahadur Deuba, who is disenchanted with both his party and India, to think that the Maoists may back him as PM. But the Maoists are probably trying to deepen the divisions within NC rather than back the man who unleashed the army against them. Even if it happens, it will not be a broad-based NC-Maoist but a Deuba-Maoist understanding.
The point of highlighting these various permutations and combinations, and the challenges inherent in each, is to underline the fact that we are operating in a context where forming the government, which requires only a simple majority, is complex and enmeshed with personal interests. Determining Nepal's political system and security structure, which is what the peace and constitutional process are about, requires an even broader consensus.
Opportunistic and personality-centred alliances, either between NC and UML or between UML and the Maoists, will not work beyond a point. Only a broad political-ideological deal between the two principal actors that conceptualised the process in the first place � Nepali Congress and the Maoists � can lead to a breakthrough. Given the current trust deficit between the two, any such understanding is unlikely.
This means that Nepal, irrespective of whether a government is formed, should expect a political and constitutional vacuum this coming May.
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