 MIN RATNA BAJRACHARYA |
In 2005, the Maoists decided at Chunbang that their immediate aim was a 'Democratic Republic Nepal'. Their Kharipati meet in 2008 declared that the objective was to draft a constitution for a 'People's Federal Democratic Republic' (PFDR). That aim persists, though many leaders at Palungtar used an alternative nomenclature � 'People's Federal Republican Nepal'.
Chunbang led to consensus and Kharipati sharpened the polarisation. How Palungtar will play out in large depends on how far the Maoists push their political project.
Broadly, this is how the Maoists define PFDR Nepal � an executive presidency; federalism with nationality as a prominent basis; secular state; 'democratisation' of the Nepal Army; 'first rights' to local communities; 'revolutionary' land reform; and eventually, restricted multiparty political competition where 'feudal and pro-imperialist' parties will not be allowed to operate.
The Maoists hope this framework would give the 'people' (read the party) a firm hold over the state, and break existing structures and nexus that govern policy. But intention is one thing and capacity, especially under the prevailing balance of power, another. A brief review reveals why this model provokes opposition from different sources and is not possible.
The Maoists want a directly elected president for multiple reasons. They do not want to return to a parliamentary system, against which they waged a war; it is seen as too unstable; and party leaders think they have the best chance to win in a direct contest. But look at the coalition ranged against it. Many see in the demand underlying ambitions for an 'authoritarian' ruler. Small parties worry this would deprive them of a share in power at the central executive level. Planners have warned about potential gridlock as a result of president-legislature battles. And the Maoists cannot push the model unilaterally in the CA.
The NA has gone through a set of changes since 2006. There is no palace to report to; a Janajati has become chief; there has been an increase in the interaction between the army brass and the defence ministry; army chiefs have testified before parliamentary committees; and there is relatively more information about how the army operates in the public domain today.
The Maoists dismiss these as token steps and cite the Katawal incident, or NA's recent lobbying on UNMIN, to show how there is no 'civilian control'. But they have neither explicitly explained what further 'democratisation' of the NA means, nor been able to allay the fears of others that this is a ploy to increase Maoist influence over the military.
Party leaders should read Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward's recent book, Obama's wars, which details how Pentagon truly boxed in the White House during the review of the Afghan war strategy and extracted an additional 30,000 troops. This is no way for democracies to function, but it will give them a sense of how governments struggle with sensitive civilian-military relationships. Crucially, the Maoists cannot push their model of integration in the changed context.
The Maoist stand on 'restricted political competition' is something no other party can accept for reasons of both principle and survival. Federalism is another polarising issue. NC, UML, and Kathmandu technocrats will not buy the Maoist map and argue it goes too far; the Madhesis and ethnic groups will claim it does not go far enough. There is however a greater degree of agreement between the national parties on the limited powers to be given to the states.
There is also a consensus among national parties in the CA on the need for land reform, though Madhesi parties have reservations. The difference is on whether compensation should be paid to those whose property is above the limit set by the state. The Maoist emphasis on 'first/prior rights' to locals over their resources is important, for the battles of the future are over resources and related displacement. This often gets linked up with their support for prior political rights for 'dominant nationalities', thus alienating parties that give precedence to individual over group rights and represent traditional interests.
The other parties do little except react to and reject Maoist proposals. But the point is to show that the Maoists cannot get a PFDR Nepal. Here is what looks achievable � a republic; possibly a directly elected head of government (with checks); secularism; a multiparty democratic system; a quasi-federal system built up incrementally over years; affirmative action for marginalised ethnicities but no recognition of 'prior rights'; and an NA under the government in principle.
Can the Maoists agree on a 'revisionist' democratic republican statute, make the compromises required to get such a system, and reconcile themselves to the fact that they will not necessarily enjoy unfettered political dominance? If Palungtar is anything to go by, the answer is no.
