The Nepali political class needs to understand where it fits into the renewed Indian focus on security
he Nepal Army chief visits India, the Indian Army chief reciprocates by visiting Nepal. The Indian foreign minister arrives in Kathmandu, the Nepali home minister goes to Delhi with security chiefs. Indian interlocutors express concern about the use of Nepali territory for anti-India activities, ask Nepal to allow sky marshals on Indian aircraft from Kathmandu, and convey to the home minister the need to arrive at an agreement on the extradition treaty.
You don't have to be a rocket scientist to guess what India's primary interest in Nepal is right now. It is security, security, and security.
The Nepali political class has to understand that they are dealing with a new, assertive, purposeful and focused Indian security establishment. P. Chidambaram's emphasis on a "thorough and radical departure from the present structure" has rung in the changes. In his path-breaking speech to the Intelligence Bureau in December 2009, the Indian home minister talked about how India is the site of all kinds of violence - secessionism, Maoism, religious fanaticism and added, "Never before has the Indian state faced such a formidable challenge." On the ground, the new security architecture has meant more police posts; more police personnel; better intelligence coordination; community policing; and quick response teams at the district level.
At the top, the practice has been of multiple intelligence agencies reporting to different masters. There have been some changes since the Mumbai attacks. Through the Multi-Agency Centre, there is better coordination of information. There is also a daily meeting under the Home Minister of the National Security Advisor, RAW and Intelligence Bureau chiefs, with bureaucrats keeping track of intelligence reports and follow-up actions.
What Chidambaram is proposing now is the creation of a National Counter Terrorism Centre along the lines of that in post-9/11 US, responsible for intelligence, investigation and operations. It would have the mandate to try to prevent and respond to violence unleashed by any group in India. All intelligence and security agencies would be under its oversight. The Home Ministry itself would deal only with internal security. The exit of M.K. Narayanan as National Security Advisor has facilitated Chidambaram's plans. Chidambaram's drive has had some results. There was no terror attack in 'mainland' India through 2009. Violence in Kashmir and the Northeast is reported to have dipped a bit. And with help from a friendly Bangladesh government, India nabbed the head of ULFA, the Assamese separatist organisation. But none of these problems are resolved, and the Naxal threat has only grown.
Nepali politicians and bureaucrats need to understand where they fit into this Indian focus on security. India wants a reliable and strong Nepali security structure. It wants an army which it can trust; a police and APF amenable to Indian requests; an intelligence department that keeps track of anti-Indian activities in Nepal and passes on information; and a political regime that is friendly.
Instead of waffling, the government must be more responsive, like it is in the case of China, when it comes to Indian security concerns. The sovereignty argument is shallow given how Nepali politicians lobby with their Indian counterparts and even bureaucrats for a range of favours, from becoming PM to getting one's son admission in a medical college.
India should ponder why despite this kind of leverage and investment, it cannot derive basic concessions. On their part, Nepali politicians should deliver on serious bilateral issues of concern to a neighbour on which we are totally dependent.
The Maoists should internalise this as well. Abusing India will only make them appear more unreliable to people like Chidambaram who come from a culture of corporate ruthlessness. If Prachanda thinks sucking up to Chinese intelligence officials, claiming India killed Madan Bhandari and Birendra, and arguing that any acknowledgement by the present government to Indian concerns is a 'sell-out' will scare India into accepting his supremacy, he is mistaken. It will only make the Indian ruling class more resistant to allowing an 'unreformed' Maoist party have hegemonic rule across the open border.
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