 MIN RATNA BAJRACHARYA |
Nepali Times: What is your overall assessment of the way the peace process has gone?
Ian Martin: When I came to Nepal in May 2005, with the armed conflict going into its tenth year, noone had predicted that within a year it would have ended and within three years an inclusive Constituent Assembly would have been elected and a republic implemented peacefully. That is an extraordinary achievement, by any standards. But it remains important not to underestimate the challenges still ahead, of determining the future of the armies and reaching sufficient consensus on an inclusive federal constitution.
Just in terms of the fragility, how does the situation of Nepal compare to your other tours of duty like, let's say, East Timor?
I don't find comparisons between radically different situations very helpful. East Timor is a small country only recently emerging from successive foreign occupations. Nepal was never colonised but has extremely complex internal dynamics, which carry the risk of new conflicts if they are not successfully addressed.
In what ways is the UN mission in Nepal unique?
UNMIN's work in supporting the Election Commission was not so different from that of other UN missions, but the 'monitoring of arms and armies' with a small number of unarmed arms monitors, rather than thousands of armed peacekeepers, has been very unusual for the UN.I think it is a model which could be followed elsewhere, at a time when peacekeeping seems to be reaching an upper limit.
How frustrating has it been to see the process being delayed time and again, or do you see that as a given?
I don't see this as a process that has moved slowly-in terms of international comparisons, it has moved quite rapidly. But the parties often set themselves unrealistic deadlines, which they then failed to meet. That said, I do think that a weakness of the process has been the absence of a multi-party mechanism for implementation of commitments. The JMCC (Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee) convened by UNMIN has been the only body meeting regularly and its mandate is limited to military issues.
What are the potential pitfalls you foresee in the constitution-making process?
Despite the consensus that the new constitution will be a federal one, there are very different views as to what this should mean in the context of Nepal, and a danger that mutually contradictory demands will be advanced without the flexibility and willingness to compromise that will be needed for agreement.
What would be the way to find that spirit of compromise among pressure groups on the various models of ethnic and regional federalism without the issue spilling out into the streets?
I wish I had a good answer to that. It is part of a larger problem, which is a culture of pursuing objectives through disruption and threats of violence not as a last resort but all too often as a first resort. Nepal can't afford this, now that it has chosen the democratic path: there is a legitimate elected body subject to the pressures of an active civil society, and that is where issues should be argued out and compromises struck. Yet even there parties block the rostrum and impede its proceedings. Peaceful protest is a fundamental right, but bandhs depend on the threat of violence and infringe the human rights of others. Trade unions have the right to strike, but even that right should be exercised after industrial relations machinery has been exhausted and they do not have the right to use force or threaten violence. Armed groups in the Tarai assume they can go on killing people up to the day when they enter into negotiations, and then expect all charges against the killers to be dropped. I hope that Nepal can build a genuinely democratic and peaceful culture, but it has a long way to go, and democratic forces should demonstrate a lead by ensuring that they and their supporters act only democratically and peacefully.
Do you see a way out of the impasse over army integration before UNMIN's extended mandate expires in July?
I don't know how quick progress towards key decisions will be now that the Army Integration Special Committee is beginning its work. I don't think it will be easy, but at least it is beginning, after months of fruitless public exchanges, when what has been needed has been to get the process agreed by the parties under way.
How difficult has it been for UNMIN to maintain its neutrality between the two former fighting sides?
UNMIN's role has been defined by agreements negotiated between the parties and this gives a clear basis for our impartiality. There is a problem of perception of neutrality when commentators misunderstand that mandate, and the problem has grown as cooperation among the political parties has eroded and some seek to involve UNMIN in partisan debates.
Is it then the choice between status quo and change that makes UNMIN vulnerable to accusation that it leans a little more on the side of the Maoists?
As I said, UNMIN's role is grounded in the agreements and these involve commitments to change, including change on the part of the Maoists to full commitment to democratic norms and values.
Some say the UN needs Nepal as a 'success story' more than Nepal needs the UN to oversee the peace process.
If Nepal doesn't need the UN, don't ask UNMIN to stay! That kind of cynicism really misunderstands the way the UN works. The UN is faced with overwhelming demands for peace operations, and Nepal is not high on the international agenda, so from the outset those of us who thought it important that the UN should respond to Nepal's request have had to argue the case-sometimes in the face of concern that the UN's involvement was high-risk, and certainly not a guaranteed success.
Your critics also say that your leaving UNMIN may actually make it easier to get the Maoists and the army to agree on issues like integration.
If the issues of integration are rapidly resolved after my departure, noone will be happier than I.
