Returning to Kathmandu after travelling for three weeks through the Tarai and Bihar, the pessimism and impending sense of doom in the capital is striking.

Will elections take place? What happens after 10 April? How is a bad election better than no election? Will it be violent? What will the Maoists do if they lose? Are the royalists allying with Madhesis?

Valid questions. But let's begin with what seems to be going relatively right. The electoral violence in the Madhes could have been a lot worse. Violations of the code of conduct are within South Asian norms. The attempt to provoke a religious backlash by bombing mosques has not worked. The security forces have tightened their grip on the Tarai without gross human rights violations yet. Armed groups are reconciled to polls.

This is not to discount the potential for violence with royalists and militants keen to discredit the process.

The elected assembly will be the most representative house in Nepal's history. Madhesis will constitute close to 30 percent of the members, given that there will be almost 115 Madhesis in the PR list and tentatively 60-70 elected Madhesis through FPTP.

Most will win as members of the bigger national parties. But that does not mean, as Madhesi parties would like us to believe, that they are all Pahadi dalals. The radicalisation in the Tarai means that even these representatives will be forced to take into account popular expectations, develop cross-party alliances on common issues like the shape and powers of federal units, and speak up.

If they fail to do so, however, or if the party leadership refuses to take their voices into account, it will deepen the alienation of the people. The Madhesi parties and armed groups will once again monopolise the space to speak on Madhesi issues.

The MJF, TMLP and SP may not fare well enough to justify their bluster over the past few months, but it is important for Kathmandu to show magnanimity and incorporate them in the post-poll power structure. Giving them a stake in both the constituent assembly process and the government will make Madhesi parties less irresponsible and send a symbolic gesture to the Tarai. It is time to think of a Madhesi chairing the constituent assembly.

The most important battle will now be the shape of the federal structure. None of the actors, except possibly the Maoists, have done any homework on the issue.

Madhesi parties know one Madhes is not possible but see it as an effective ploy to counter attempts by Kathmandu to stick to the present vertical development zone model. The dynamics among Madhesi parties in the assembly will be a mix of cooperation and conflict.

They will cooperate to oppose centralisation, but there will be conflict that will stem from caste rivalries, differences in political ideologies, and because leaders are already competing to become the first chief minister of the Madhes.

Politics never works in a linear manner. The Madhes, like the rest of the country, is really at the crossroads. A bumpy but progressive road lies ahead if all actors stay the course, learn lessons of the past year, recognise issues of Madhesi identity and representation, build reformed state institutions, reconcile caste diversities and conceive of ways to implement a federal system as soon as possible.

On the other hand, militant radicalisation, Pahadi-Madhesi polarisation, caste wars, institutional breakdown and a prolonged armed conflict could complicate matters. 10 April and its aftermath will determine which path the Madhes will take.