The Maoist invasion of Kathmandu for Friday's planned victory rally was a calculated move: the anger of Valley residents initially seemed to be acceptable collateral damage for a national show of force. Pushpa Kamal Dahal needed a chance to show his warriors the war was worth it.
In the beginning, some families who were coerced into feeding and sheltering rebel squads saw it as a price to pay for peace. But when, for the first time, Valley households got a feel for what has been a reality in the hinterland for years, they hit back.
Dahal called off his address to calm feelings in the capital, but in doing so lost any chance he had of using the rally as his party's coming out celebration, a conversion from militarist force to mainstream outfit. The time is opportune for the rebels to signal their readiness to renounce violence, to publicly fulfil the promise made in last November's 12-point understanding to join competitive politics.
Either that, or the Maoist supremo could decide to waste the opportunity presented by Tuesday's midnight agreement and continue to keep his followers falsely motivated. This would be disastrous not just for the country but also for the Maoist goal of achieving political power through the ballot. The leadership has been late in counselling its fighters and workers of the course-correction at the top.
All peaceful forces are more than willing not to call Dahalji's bluff when he speaks radically, as long as the subtext is 'arms management'. Even the UML, which faces the gravest challenge from a Maoist party in competition, hopes the rebel group will use this agreement to launch its campaigning for constituent assembly elections.
Concessions by the political parties should not be underestimated by the Maoist leaders or anyone else. The seven parties have shown statesmanship in the willingness to give underground armed rebels equal status in an interim legislature and government. In return, Mr Dahal must now implement the agreement with due diligence and publicly reject violence.
The rebels have to go furthest in making the agreement a success. Even as guerrillas head for their seven cantonments, their leaders must rein in the militia which is causing havoc across the land and undermining the Maoists' own support base.
From Baluwatar to Palungtar there will be relief only when Maoist fighters are confined with guns locked up in boxes fitted with UN sensors. If the government restores police chowkis, if the political parties at last muster the courage to go back to the villages, and if the Maoists make all this possible by renouncing violence, then it will truly be time to celebrate.
