The diplomat's burden - Nepali Times

NEW DELHI. Recent discussions in Kathmandu about the possible departure of Ambassador Rakesh Sood reflect deep ignorance of how policy is formulated in complex government set-ups. It also misses a more overarching reality � India, like Nepali politicians, has moved on from the 2006 framework to a more uncertain and dangerous trajectory.
In diplomacy, individuals matter, but it is rare for them to overcome the systemic red lines.

In 2005, foreign secretary Shyam Saran, intelligence chief PK Hormese Tharakan, and ambassador Shiv Shanker Mukherjee played an instrumental role. They helped convince India, a status quoist power in the region, to support a fairly radical change in the neighbourhood.

But they were aided in this task by a range of broader political factors. The king's actions; GPK's willingness to deal with the Maoists; the strengthening of the Baburam line within the Maoists; the Indian government's dependence on the left parties internally; the focus on the 'peaceful periphery' in Delhi's policy circles; and a growing recognition that royal rule was not sustainable all created the context for the 12-point agreement.

The guiding principle here was to help get the Maoists into the 'mainstream', but ensure they remained a secondary force.

Indian diplomats worked overtime to fulfil this dual, often contradictory, aim. To assure the Maoists, they consented to UNMIN; backed the CA roadmap; encouraged Maoist participation in government; and asked other parties to be flexible. To weaken them, they supported Madhesi forces, pushed Maoists during the arms agreements, assured the Nepal Army its interests would be protected, and bet on elections to lock the former rebels in.

The election results showed their plan � or at least its second component � didn't work, but Delhi stuck to the same script. When Rakesh Sood arrived in April 2008, his brief specified that the Maoists had to be given their rightful share in the power structure, but also had to be kept under strong check. Sood's initial statements were in fact interpreted by NC leaders as being too soft on the Maoists.

It was Maoist actions in government that alienated multiple constituencies � NC leaders, traditional religious leadership, the business community, and of course, the NA generals, who all feared loss of power and privileges. All of them began lobbying hard with India to 'do something about the Maoists'. The Maoist rhetoric on equidistance and attempts to play the China card had anyway not won it friends in Delhi. And when they acted against General Katawal, India � which had repeatedly warned Dahal away from the army � reacted. Delhi decided it could not 'let the Nepal Army fall', and allow 'Nepal to turn into a Maoist state'.

While the ambassador's inputs played a part in shaping such a line, it was by no means Sood's policy. Assessments by RAW, Indian defence brass, the Indian home ministry, the anti-Maoist orientation of the political leadership in Delhi, and the changing domestic equations in Nepal all played an equally important role in convincing India's cabinet committee on security that the approach had to be reviewed. Sood naturally became the face of the new Indian hardline policy � keep the Maoists out at all costs, force them to 'reform', engage them without granting any concessions, and when necessary, confront them.

Keeping the largest party out of power in another country is a hazardous enterprise. And from the perspective of establishment insiders, Sood turned out to be an effective diplomat who succeeded in implementing an unpopular policy line.

Could Sood have presented a more nuanced view to Delhi, and used Indian leverage constructively to get the process back on track? Perhaps, by offering more carrots along with sticks to the Maoists. Could his style have been less abrasive? Definitely, as even some of his colleagues in MEA agree. And could he have dealt with issues like Kantipur and MRP differently? Yes, by taking a broader view of India's interests and conveying his case more diplomatically.

But to conclude that the ambassador was at the root of the India-Maoist impasse, and his exit � whenever it happens � will change policy is shockingly naive. Only this week, Indian sources said that a crisis had merely been postponed by extending the CA last year; that they saw no chance of the Maoists compromising on fundamental issues; and it was important for Nepali 'democratic forces' to stick together and be ready for the coming confrontation next May. "We have the appetite for a fight, Nepali forces must be ready," said a senior official.

Rakesh Sood represents the strategic resolve in India to take the Nepali Maoists head on if needed, and a tough intolerant approach on 'security issues' that is the hallmark of Indian diplomacy in the neighbourhood. A more balanced assessment of his tenure, instead of succumbing to a black-and-white portrayal, will only help us understand the complex India-Nepal relationship better.

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1. Arthur
Ok so Sood's replacement may be no better since Indian policy has not changed.

"It was Maoist actions in government that alienated multiple constituencies ï¿½ NC leaders, traditional religious leadership, the business community, and of course, the NA generals, who all feared loss of power and privileges. All of them began lobbying hard with India to 'do something about the Maoists'."

If Nepalis were willing to live on less than $2 per day to avoid alienating NC leaders, traditional religious leadership, the business community and NA generals then of course they could retain their power and privileges by relying on India instead of their "leadership" of the Nepali people.

But if the Nepali people are not willing to preserve their power and privileges they will not accept India imposing that either.

Ultimately India faces the choice of either trying to govern Nepal iteself (since those turning to India to preserve their powers and privileges are obviously incapable of doing so) or else accepting that the Nepali people will do so and butt out.

Examples such as Soviet invasion of Afghanistan show that even after the US defeat in Vietnam it is still possible for countries to stupidly believe they can rule other countries until taught otherwise by experience.

But there seems so little prospect of success with that kind of policy in the 21st century that India should be very nervous of suffering the same fate as the Soviets if it did try.

So far Indian has only shown a willingness to manipulate Nepali politicians. If those politicians give up the pretence of democracy and try to rule without elections after next expiry of Constituent Assembly they would need actual Indian troops to keep supplies flowing for the NA to suppress popular revolt. Does India really have the appetite for that?

Posted on: 24 DEC 2010 | 8:01 PM NST

2. Anonymous
The complexity of India-Nepal relationship is the resultant outcome of the interactions beetween the continued 'colonial mindset' of the ruling establishment in India (inherited from her colonial past!) and the continued submissiveness of the ruling elites in Nepal (previously the Royal Palace, now, the political parties and the NA) to the ditktat of the 'Almightly Prabhoo' in the South. That relationship has fundamentally been questioned by the recent historic events and by the leadership of an emerging new generation of politically conscious and educated class in Nepal. Freeing from that 'historically frozen' and moribund relationship and embarking upon a new healthy course, based on mutual resepct and reciprocity, can be in the best of interests of both peoples in terms of political, economic, and national security perspectives. (Hopefully, the newly educated and professionally saavy class in India will also increasingly realize such necessity down the road! Sadly, the South Block has a history of ignoring the alternative narratives, such as the 'Gujral doctrine' in the past). The contradictory and confused position of Delhi, as rightly pointed out by the gentleman, largely emanates from Delhi's inability to reframe its overarching policy vis a vis her neighbors in the South Asian sub-continent. (Delhi's ambition to secure a permanent seat in the UN Security Council seems pretty immature (and could even be very much destabilizing for the entire region) at this stage. India's key and urgent priority should perhaps be directed to do the 'proper homeworks' to promote stability and peace and earn the much-needed trust from her neighbors in the Region!) While Mr. Sood's positive role should be appreciated, expecting too much or too less from him alone would be simply naive; afterall, he is just another apparatchik in the row of a seemingly 'outmoded machine' !

Posted on: 24 DEC 2010 | 10:55 PM NST

3. DBB
What a shame? How and when can we Nepalis decide our own fate? I have not seen a single political analysis without the India factor being tne prime driver in anything we want to do from writing a constitution to taking care of our people. Yes I agree that we havc a very strong socio-economic-polical relationship with our powerful neighbour. But is that the only most important factor that shapes our furture? Are we Nepalis so incapable? Can any polictical pundit tell me how we can do better ourselves in our unique geo-political situation.

Posted on: 25 DEC 2010 | 7:53 PM NST

4. jange
3. DBB

Can any polictical pundit tell me how we can do better ourselves in our unique geo-political situation.

Yes. Make me lifetime dictator! And all will be perfect.

Posted on: 26 DEC 2010 | 7:11 AM NST

5. K. K. Sharma

Thank you Prasanta for showing the reality of geopolitics. Excelent article. Congratulations for finally coming down to reality, in stead of rhetoric on theories and wishful thinking by way of writing on " Should be".

Posted on: 26 DEC 2010 | 7:47 PM NST

6. NepaliEconomy.com

ï¿½We can choose our friends, but we canï¿½t chose our neighborsï¿½

We canï¿½t escape from the fact that India is our neighbor and we are more dependend on India than it is to us. India also has more leverage on us economically, politically and culturally. We canï¿½t also ignore the reality that India has vested interest in Nepal, which can conflict with Nepalï¿½s own interests ï¿½ they may be related to its national security concerns, or simply its desire to prove its ï¿½big power statusï¿½. Nepal canï¿½t expect any better from any other country whether China or the US.

The challenge for Nepal is to manage Indiaï¿½s interests for its own benefit. The case in point is the Sri Lankan civil war. President Rajapaksa astutely asked India for militiary supplies to supress LTTE but when India refused for domestic political reasons (Tamil parties are in the coalition government), he turned to China. The rest, as they say, is history.

Nepal can do the same but unfortunately canï¿½t because of the divisive nature of Nepalï¿½s politics. Given the deep divisions within the country, India has in esssense become the kingmaker as one political party or an institution turns to India to enhance its position when it is weak (Congress and Nepal Army now and the Moists before 2007).

The bottom-line, lets stop bitching about India, and first keep our house in order.

Posted on: 26 DEC 2010 | 4:48 AM NST

7. kabulekanchho
Does relations with Nepal really require a very skilled/refined diplomat? I do not think so. Looks at the state of affairs of the country run (both in government and in the opposition) by uncouth, undereducated and violent hooligans. As they say in Hindi, laaton ka bhoot baaton se nahi maanta, India and all the other countries who have little love for Nepal, should send only strong armed musclemen as their diplomats in the Himalayan wonderland a.k.a. Nepal.

Posted on: 27 DEC 2010 | 12:07 PM NST

8. Post
Well articulated!

Posted on: 27 DEC 2010 | 7:15 PM NST