And that is the problem. Unless they are weakened, they will not be allowed to govern the country, for their agenda is too dangerous to be allowed a free reign. The past year has essentially been a battle to this end. Non-Maoists are trying to weaken the Maoists by stoking their internal divisions and co-opting sections of their social base. The Maoists are countering this by expanding their organisation on the ground, keeping up popular agitations, and creating one enemy after another to keep the flame of 'revolution' alive.
To expect a political force to become weaker voluntarily is na�ve, but in the liberal democratic framework, espousal of non-violence and the rule of law are two tools used to keep parties in check, ensure the destructive impulses of large groups are controlled, and slow down the process of political change.
The Maoists derive a degree of their strength through their coercive apparatus. The logic of the peace process was that they would have to give up these structures, primarily the PLA. The Maoists feel they have done so by keeping them in cantonments. They claim that their support is totally based on popular mobilisation rather than force, and accuse other parties of not keeping their promise on integration. The non-Maoists feel that it is by keeping the PLA intact through state resources that the former rebels have become stronger, and allege that Maoists do not want to move on integration themselves.
The constellation of anti Maoist forces � the president, NC-UML, Nepal Army (NA), and India � means that until the Maoists make substantive movement on the PLA question, they will not be given space in the formal state apparatus.
It is an interesting moment, for the same leaders who till six months ago were insisting that there could be absolutely no integration of the Maoists now emphasise that integration must happen. They have become extremely flexible on numbers: from talking about 3,000 in the security forces, NC leaders now privately speak of how 8,000 former combatants can be taken in and a generous rehabilitation offered to the rest.
For the Maoists, this concession by others is a victory. The fact that the PLA is not in fact their core source of strength (rather than its fraternal organisations and the YCL) is allowing them to be flexible, as Prachanda's speech demonstrated on Wednesday.
But they face three problems. They are being asked to move on integration at a time when they are the most insecure. The Maoists are isolated domestically and unsure of whether the constitutional process and their agenda will be implemented, so do not know whether this is the best time to give up the PLA. This is why they are seeking credible guarantees on other issues through a package deal.
Secondly, the question of the PLA, for the Maoists, ties in with the 'democratisation of the NA', which in their estimation has not taken place at all. Integration was a method to change the structure and character of the NA and make it a 'friendly force', but that is not possible anymore given the balance of power.
And thirdly, the PLA ties in with the internal power balance in the party. Certain leaders do not care much for the PLA anymore as their support comes from elsewhere. But there are leaders whose sole strength comes from the existence of the PLA, and they feel they need to extract something now from any agreement on integration.
The Maoists seem to recognise that playing a double game on the PLA (saying it is under the Special Committee while maintaining an iron grip) is no longer possible. In the taskforce discussions, there is in fact a remarkable degree of convergence. However, the non-Maoists insist that numbers be decided on before the Maoists are allowed to join government. The Maoists insist that this should happen through a process of consultations, and that it should not be a pre-condition to a national unity government.
The Maoists appear to have done a cost-benefit analysis and decided it is worth making certain unilateral concessions, for unlocking the PLA issue will alter the political game quite drastically.
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