MIN RATNA BAJRACHARYA |
The Maoist 'postponement' of the general strike has drawn diverse reactions. The ruling parties have projected it as a victory of democracy, constitutionalism and law, and a massive defeat for the Maoist 'politics of blackmail'. Sections of the media and civil society that had urged the Maoists to pull back feel it is a result of the popular pressure exerted by the peace rally on Friday morning. And while some Maoist leaders and cadre are reported to be confused, demoralised, and angry at the leadership for letting go, others are hopeful that this will pave the way for an agreement on peace and the constitution.
The responses are naturally shaped by one's own location on the political spectrum. But what it ignores is that there is a complex set of factors that led to the Maoist decision. The non-Maoist euphoria also glosses over the fact that the strike was not the problem; it was only a symptom of the problem. And while the strike is off for now, those underlying issues remain unresolved.
The Maoists made four miscalculations.
One, Prachanda appears to have thought that getting hundreds of thousands on the streets would generate enough moral pressure on the government to resign. They did not realise that a government that has not been elected by the masses, and is not infused with a sense of responsibility towards citizens, would not really bother if the country stayed shut � NC-UML's only option was to stay inert and they did that.
Two, the Maoists thought the disenchantment of the Kathmandu populace with the government could be translated into support for the Maoists, and that increasing frustrations due to the banda would be directed against Madhav Nepal. But resistance against government is high when oppression by government is high. The present government is ineffectual and lame, but it is not dictatorial, so the people had no immediate incentive to rebel. In fact, many of Kathmandu's locals suffered due to the hidden violence of the Maoists during the strike. The party also failed to communicate the purpose of the movement effectively, and even potential sympathisers were left wondering why there was need for such a massive movement right now. By relying on the middle class for support, the Maoists essentially forgot their own principle that this class is 'vacillating and opportunistic'.
Three, they calculated that a prolonged deadlock would force the international community, particularly the Indians, to step in and stitch a deal together, giving space to the Maoists. And four, the 'military-bourgeoisie' alliance, manifested in the consolidation of all non-Maoist political forces, president and army would fracture, and there would be fissures within both NC and UML, eroding the government's strength. On these fronts, the Maoists underestimated the resolve of the Indians as well as domestic political forces not to allow the Maoists back in 'till they change'. Last year's Katawal episode has been a turning point in hardening attitudes against the Maoists. And the more the Maoists continue with militant mass politics, the tougher the non-Maoist camp will get.
The Maoists also relied too heavily on non-regional international actors (US, EU, UN) but none of them could be supportive of a crippling strike and exerted pressure on the Maoists to change the form of the protest. Anyway, when it comes to crunch time in Nepali politics, these actors fade away and India is the decisive factor. And Delhi had made up its mind not to let the Maoists, especially Prachanda, win this round.
Add to this the internal fissures within the Maoist party itself, where Baburam Bhattarai's heart was not really in a movement of this nature. He had agreed with the need to protest, but also recognised the need to build bridges with other parties and classes instead of sharpening the polarisation.
So the Maoists analysed the objective conditions, saw the strike was reduced to a proposition with diminishing returns, recognised that too many forces had ganged up against them, and opted for a 'tactical retreat'.
Prachanda was confident he could convince the cadre, which he partially did with an inflammatory speech at Khula Manch on Saturday. The Maoists are now trying to make the best of a bad situation, by acting magnanimous; putting the onus on the government; earning some brownie points with the internationals; and winning public sympathy for being a 'sensitive and responsible' party. The top leaders feel this is a battle that could go on till May 28 and beyond. Sustaining a strike till then would be difficult, and so this could serve as a breather to regroup and re-strategise like they used to do during ceasefires during the war. But they also know that it will be difficult to mobilise on the same scale in a short time-span again, and so are continuing with the movement; shuffling cadres (sending some back, getting people from other places); and relying on the 70,000 plus Kathmandu-based party members.
The non-Maoist parties are smug, which is fine for this is a temporary victory in narrow terms. But the 'democratic' camp needs to figure out what their core objective is. If it is only weakening and humiliating the Maoists, then they can sit tight and wait for the Maoists to get more desperate. The Indian strategy to deal with the Maoists is a classic approach they adopt in their own country with groups in Kashmir and the Northeast � engage, coerce, co-opt, frustrate the cadre, divide, weaken, give nothing and then repeat the cycle. NC, UML and Madhesi parties can continue to be domestic instruments to implement this Indian strategy. This will leave the Maoists with either no choice but to give in to all the demands made by the ruling alliance or unleash their destructive prowess (which was held in check last week); the possibility of the latter happening is higher. And the Maoist organisation and ability to mobilise masses, as demonstrated through last week should give ample warning to the others about the risks involved in this approach.
Alternately, NC and UML can now begin an earnest process of engagement and reciprocal concessions with the Maoists and convince India this is the best way to go.
The Maoists have to give up their double game on integration and put the PLA under the Special Committee in practice (a promise made by Prachanda last year in front of the combatants in the fourth division in Nawalparasi). Numbers and process have to be agreed upon. On property return, informed sources tell us that almost all land has been returned in the eastern, central and western region; the Maoists continue to hold on to a lot of confiscated property in the mid-west and far-west, which they have to be pressurised to return while a simultaneous exercise in land reform is initiated. Issues that have to be addressed in the longer term are the YCL and contentious constitutional matters.
In turn, the other parties have to concede two things � extension of the CA, which the Maoists desperately want despite the rhetoric of declaring a constitution from the streets; and a national unity government. The leadership of the government is a contentious issue, but mid-level Maoist leaders privately say that if there is an agreement on the issues, they can create an environment in the party to force Prachanda to be flexible in the larger interests of the process.
Political analyst CK Lal often says that patience after Gaur (where 27 Maoist activists were butchered) gave the Maoists the peace process; restraint after Dang (where 7 Maoists were killed a day before the polls) gave them the CA and election victory. Resilience and courage to make difficult decisions at this critical juncture will make them politically unassailable.