Ever since the United Nations was brought in to be the acceptable third-party for overseeing Nepal's peace process, it has served as a convenient lightning rod for everyone with a gripe.

The royal right reveled in bashing UNMIN for being soft on the Maoists. The Maoists lashed out at UNMIN every time their shenanigans were exposed, like the time one-third of the combatants in the cantonments were found in the verification process to be underaged non-combatants. UNMIN, especially its chief Ian Martin, has come under blistering attack in New Delhi for overstepping the UN's mandate and for being too big for his boots. The Nepali media, including this paper, has had a periodic go at UNMIN for timidity and profligacy.

As the six-month extension of its term draws to a close in July, it is time to take stock. It can be said that the ceasefire and the remarkable political makeover of the past two years would not have been possible without the presence of UNMIN.
The Indians helped set the stage by getting the Maoists and the seven parties together in New Delhi in November 2005 to sign their 12-point accord. But after that they had a real struggle convincing their own foreign affairs bureaucracy to get over its NIMBY syndrome and accept the UN as a neutral entity.

To address the many sensitivities we resorted to semantics. The word 'mediator' was replaced with 'monito&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;'. 'Demobilisation and disarmament' sounded too much like a surrender and was replaced with 'arms managemen&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#'&#̵'216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;216;'. 'Cantonments' and 'containers' were concocted.

UNMIN was often ridiculed for looking the other way when the YCL was formed and went on the rampage. So sensitive was it to safeguarding neutrality that UNMIN ignored many blatant violations of the peace accord. The Maoists figured out early on that they could string UNMIN along by its nose.

After embarrassing fiascos in other world hotspots, the United Nations needed a successful peace operation as much as Nepal did.

We all knew not all the guns were in the containers and not all the guerrillas were in the camps. We knew the YCL was a recruitment centre for hardcore fighters. We knew Maoists trooped out of cantonments during the election campaign to rough up other parties. The Maoists knew UNMIN knew and both knew we knew. But we all played along for the sake of peace in this country.

With their unexpected win in elections, Maoist hardliners have changed their minds about UNMIN and now want them to leave when the mandate expires in July.

We agree that a bulk of UNMIN can pack up. But perhaps a skeletal team should remain to take care of unfinished business. There are still too many things up in the air: decommissioning of arms, security sector reform, and the need for the international community's eyes and ears in case there is trouble from residual hardliners.

The next prime minister is going to be the commander of two armies. One of the parties in the governing alliance has an army of its own. Not to mention a vanguard youth wing that seems to be out of control. We are not out of the woods yet.