The biggest indicator of how far we've come in the last 18 months is that there is no longer a peace talks team. The mainstreaming of the Maoists began with their signing the 12-point understanding with the seven-party alliance in November 2005, helping create the conditions for the April Uprising. The second test of their commitment to making the transition was the comprehensive peace agreement and cantonment of combatants. Then came promulgation of the interim constitution and formation of an interim parliament which included the Maoists.

Now, at the end of the fourth phase of this ongoing peace process, the former rebels are in the interim government.

It's been a long journey over the last 12 years for the Maoist leadership, from parliament to the countryside and then the jungles, from exile back to where they started-Singha Darbar. The Nepali people will be waiting for signs that the comrades-in-government have learnt some lessons along the way and know they, like the other parties, are here to govern.

The CPN-M cannot now revert to their old dismissal of parliamentary democracy as bourgeois gameplaying. Instead, the Maoist ministers must learn how to use the tactics of democracy for the greater good. They will have to guard against the diktat-based decision-making procedures favoured by revolutionaries. The machinery of the government here is hardly a model of integrity and efficiency anyway, and the new ministers will have to find ways to inspire uncooperative bureaucrats, not threaten them.

Individual corruption is bad enough, and parties often make it worse by institutionalising graft. The CPN-M will suffer a serious blow to its legitimacy if it makes decisions under the influence of voluntary contributions to the party. A wayward minister can be taken to task, but you can't redeem a whole party involved in the kickback loop, as amply displayed by the UML ever since it decided to impose levies on its representatives in government.

Favouritism is endemic in revolutionary outfits. Again, the UML's stint as a ruling party has lessons for the Maoists. They will have to find ways of calming disgruntled party members without dispensing favours billed to the exchequer.

The Maoists must remember that they continue to be under the scanner of the international community as well as civil society. Their procedural legitimacy is tenuous until they face the electorate. Until then, they must acquire legitimacy of performance. Failure of the peace process from this point on will cost the country more than we could ever imagine.