A culture of fear has enveloped Nepal. Parachuting conflict specialists may link it to the purported Nepali culture of fatalism, but there are several inter-connecting threads, not the least the royal takeover and its backing by certain Kathmandu-based embassies followed by military aid in the name of protecting people, peace and democracy.

One diplomat said at the time that the royal move had to be supported because of a lack of alternatives. One cannot but help wonder what would have happened had there been no foreign intervention at that or other crucial junctures in our history. Could Nepalis, left to our own devices (a thought unbearable to many official foreigner friends apparently) have done any worse? Would we have been able to better initiate processes that militarise society and enfeeble our democratic structures? Would we have been able to cultivate a more widespread culture of fear and suspicion?

This is spreading amidst the day-to-day anonymous deaths of villagers, and now comes the idea of the civilian military campaign and its accompanying Village-Town Security Concept (VTSS) under which locals are to be trained and armed to resist Maoist insurgents. The plan has been widely condemned by groups such as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and national human rights bodies. Exactly why the Rural Volunteer Security Groups and Peace Committees is such a terrible idea and will have longterm and disastrous impact for Nepal is clear from Guatemala's experience with such voluntary civilian militia.

As pointed out by Amnesty International, such plans "place the civilian population in grave danger by seriously compromising their neutrality". In contravention of the Geneva Convention, the establishment of a civil militia blurs the distinction between civilians and combatants and renders all civilians at higher risk. The term 'volunteer' is made irrelevant in such situations: one must volunteer or be labelled a Maoist with all its concomitant consequences. In the long run, this will have disastrous implications in tearing apart the social fabric, for one must either be 'with' the 'volunteers' or 'against' them-there is no neutral ground.

Since the government cannot risk having the guns turned back on them, the civil militias are likely to be badly trained and armed. Thus the approach in practice appears little different from the Maoists and their tactics of using human shields.

The strategy of arming civilians in counter-insurgency was used to devastating effect by US-backed regimes in Latin America, notably Peru and Guatemala. In 1995 the Committee against Torture in the United Nations called for the complete abolition of so-called 'Voluntary Committees of Civic Defence' in Guatemala in view of the human rights violations and violence committed by these civilian auxiliaries. While it was officially disbanded in 1996, in November 2003 civil patrols in the northern area of Guatemala kidnapped and demanded a ransom for the local mayor. Once initiated, these civil militia cannot be easily disbanded. The difference between civil militia and death squads, private armies, vigilantes and warlordism is less tenuous than we think.

In Nepal, the RPP has taken over the civilian apparatus. We have CDOs under effective military control within a unified command structure who are unlikely to go against the directives of the army which surrounds them. Now, we also have armed civilians who constitute another coercive force. In the midst of this, the government plans to have elections. Elections can be held. The question is, will they be free, fair and unfettered by fear?

It is not clear from where the idea of a voluntary civilian militia emerged. It may have been a conflict adviser with a background in Latin America who flew in, scribbled some notes and flew back out. It may have resulted from the input of Kathmandu-based embassy staffers here for three to four year before their next posting. They will go on with their lives, we Nepalis have to live with the consequences.

Explaining a plan to keep a village safe by encircling it in a wall of barbed wire, Lt Colonel Nathan Sassaman, battalion commander of the forces occupying Abu Hishma, Iraq, said the following: "With a healthy dose of fear and violence, and a lot of money for projects, I think we can convince these people that we are here to help them."
We have been encircled by, and enmeshed in, all of those three variables in Nepal for a while now. But it is becoming harder for many of us to remain convinced that donors of all shapes and sizes are here to help us. The paradox is that the logic of the fear, violence and money has made it harder for Nepali people to press for peace and real democratic change without the help of foreign intervention. And that is a fearful prospect.

Seira Tamang is a political scientist based at Martin Chautari.

"We can't protect every village."

Major General Pradip Pratap Malla, chief of the Royal Nepali Army's Eastern Division explains why the government's policy of arming the general population is both feasible and logical.

. A year after setting up the eastern divisional headquarters, the army has created 21 new posts in the eastern region that will train local people to resist the Maoists. We can't provide protection to each and every village. But if necessary, the unified command will provide security, provide arms and train resistance committees.

. We will ensure that the arms and munitions will not be misused through local committees and responsible village leaders will be entrusted with the hardware. We will also keep the details of the persons who get the arms.

. Many places have asked us for arms, but we first evaluate the situation before handing them guns. We also want to ensure that the guns are returned to us once peace is restored.

. Nepalis know guns, many own them. Others who worked abroad as security guards have handled them. But the Maoists have snatched small arms from many owners. So, what is wrong with giving licensed arms holders guns so they can protect themselves?