Thanks for the article 'Why do we need tanks?' by Kanak Mani Dixit (#145), which was to the point. There are just two things for the writer to consider. The first is deduce how much of the arms spree is to "boost the capability" of the Royal Nepali Army (RNA), and how much to intimidate the Maoists? To somewhat paraphrase von Calusewitz, (re)arming is also negotiations by other means. And, second, a civilian oversight of security matters is essential. I'm surprised the writer left the paragraph unfinished. This is where the role of the Defence Council comes in. So far it has only played a symbolic role and it needs to be vested with powers to monitor security matters and determine national policy from a broader perspective, rather than on the basis of knee jerk reactions. The Maoist threat has made it clear that modernisation of the army is essential, but it needs to be done through capacity building that will improve the overall performance of the army. Acquiring better armaments is only one part of it, but it needs to be followed by qualitative, rather than quantitative, development of its manpower and greater intelligence capacity.

Meanwhile, the Armed Police Force is already redundant, though nothing has been done to scrap it, or partially absorb it (within the RNA and Police) after the army took the lead security role after the state of emergency. National crises can always lead to a call for arms, which unchecked can develop a momentum of its own that can drain the economy and bring in unnecessary equipment into the country. The key in any democratic system is accountability. We cannot pretend to cling on to the system, without accepting this essential precondition.

GB Chhetri,
Mumbai