There ought to be a single, preferably monosyllabic word we can use as shorthand for the premise that violence will not get Nepal anywhere. Unfortunately, the word does not exist in either Nepali or English. Equally unfortunately, neither the Maoists nor the government can at this point adopt that position without a considerable loss of face, as well as actual authority. Even if one of them were to say 'enough', too many bridges have already been burnt, too much trust has been seen to be betrayed. The victory, even if it comes to the Nepali state, will be harsh and eventually inconclusive. By papering over existing angst, there could simply emerge another, bloodier insurgency, again with its roots in credible grievances, and again unacceptable in its brutality.

So how do we go about this? Let us have no more talk about 'talks' without specifying what a dialogue entails. Let's not talk about a 'solution' either, for that supposes a level of simplicity that just is not there. It will take time, years, for the genie that exploded out of the bottled frustrations of the Nepali people to vapourise. We'll make progress and then just as surely we'll backslide. The key is to keep at it.

Revolutionaries and reactionaries alike, no matter how you define them, lay particular emphasis on appearances. That bias is built into the very tools of politics. As they are talking-arguing more like it-neither side can be expected to lay down arms. The rebels would be nowhere without their guns. For the state, it will be important to keep up the military pressure but also come across as being strong in other ways, for instance morally. The army will have to have a zero tolerance policy for excesses. Meanwhile, military battles won must be consolidated through better security conditions and at least marginal improvements in the quality of life for the people in the area.

Now for the hard part: how to pull this all together. To start with, we can at least ensure that all of us who are not for the Maoists are on the same page of the debate. As we've said in this space before, all forces that believe in democracy must present a united front. That needs thinkers, political parties, politicians to brainstorm productively, which isn't happening. Differences of opinion are expressed with a serious paucity of analysis or even grace, in petty, diluted forms. People are talking-often shouting-at each other and getting defensive instead of arguing their position. Debate is good, and used wisely, would help present the Maoists with nuanced, relatively inclusive proposals for how to proceed from here. A multifaceted understanding on the specifics of subjects under negotiation is the only way to move forward.

The terms of reference for the dialogue are different now. For one, no one is about to stand up and deny that the insurgency has its roots in legitimate grievances, so let's take that as a given. Let's not assess every strategic or tactical proposition in terms of whether or not it will resolve the root problems; nothing but a lot of time, work, and money will do that. Let us instead start focusing on specifics-for example, the precise efficacy or otherwise of military aid in maintaining a holding pattern while a negotiation process is worked through; the confusion over the constitution; the magic words 'constituent assembly', which are never given substance; how to give people some cover in the absence of local governments; and so on. We don't need fragile, much-maligned 'compromises'. This is about winning some, losing some, and actually redefining other positions.

If the people on this side understand the framework within which they are now operating, and the most basic, even grudging, kind of unity that is required of them, we can begin. That is realistic. That can help build the unity of purpose that would bring the political parties and all other aboveground forces together. This is the first step to strengthening the hand of the state. For the unknown quantity, the leaders of the insurgency, we can only hope to take strategic actions that force them to react. The 'state side' must then put together a team that is inclusive in every sense to talk to the insurgents.

Eventually, this is the attitude that will win people on this side the badge of being truly progressive. The Maoists will have the satisfaction of effecting the kind of change they want through legal, institutionalised means. For both sides it will much closer to a real victory than any face-saving gesture.

The state is in a disorganised daze. The Maoists cadre must feel they are winning, even as their political leadership must know that the long-term prognosis is not favourable. But there is always Lord Pashupatinath, who has been known to come to the people's aid in times of acute crisis. Maybe he will come of his perch now that we have managed to make a royal mess of everything, and somehow get a dialogue going.