It could be the 11 September anniversary or the news of fresh slaughter here at home, but the combined result is a terrific sense of terror-fatigue. This is the kind of weariness that comes after talking so much about it, seeing so much of it that you go beyond caring. Or, your shut yourself off because you can't bear the emotional stress anymore.

We who have not been directly affected by the butchery, are in a sense just spectators. What must the bereaved be going through: family members like Ambika, the widow of sub-inspector Surendra Basnet, and her two boys, Amir and Ajit? What of the relatives of young boys and girls forced to join the militant underground, or who enlisted out of desperation? Do their families know of their fate? This week alone, there are tens of thousands of fathers, mothers, wives, sisters and brothers mourning for the 200 Nepalis who died at the hands of other Nepalis this week.

This numbing and mindless bloodshed has gone on too long. It is hard to see who benefits from it besides arms merchants, their brokers, and those who want to see the extinction of the Nepali nation.

And as the vultures wheel overhead, we catch the repugnant glimpse of a government that has given up doing anything about anything. Political leaders who have lost all legitimacy in the eyes of the public, are clinging on to power by the finger nails.

It would be stupid of the Maoists not to exploit this power vacuum and political disarray. They're good at what they do. And ruthless.The Maoists are simply exploiting the chronic weaknesses of the security forces-fatal flaws in preparedness, strategy and intelligence-gathering. One side seems to learn from every battle, the other side seems incapable of doing so. It\'s not that the Maoists are particularly brilliant, it\'s just that the government is daft.
The police and soldiers in Sindhuli and Argakhanchhi fought valiantly this week. But after Mangalsen and Khara, the strategy should have been to prevent such hand-to-hand combat in the first place with early warning, pre-emptive and proactive deployment. Instead, they waited in vulnerable garrisons for the onslaught even after Maoists in the village below had been rousing the populace with slogans on loudspeakers hours beforehand.

In attack after attack, the Maoists' tactics have been clear even to lay observers: use of overwhelming force, human shields, precise automatic and long-range firepower, surprise and panic to get the defenders to expend ammunition, before over-running the base.

Not to be prepared with forward defence, pre-emptive intelligence and a contingency plan when you know what is coming is not just being fatalistic: it shows a death-wish. This is ideal terrain for small bands of guerrillas to ravage a conventional army. If the security forces do not upgrade the quality of their intelligence, then this war can drag on for decades more. But you can\'t fight it when the intelligence budget is used as pocket money.

There has to be a concept of operations from the high command to the brigade and platoon levels laying out broad guidelines for soldiers in the field: on the objective and how to get there, how to deal with the civilians, how to counter overwhelming force on isolated garrisons.

What needs to be done at the political level is another matter altogether. You cannot cover your political failures by trying in vain to force the military to gain an upper hand in the battlefield. How long do we have to wait for that decisive political leadership to break this cycle of violence?